By Jaye Gaskia
Oftentimes when we
hear the word storm, what comes to mind is the destructive force of such a
weather phenomenon. We think of the accompanying strong winds felling trees and
lifting properties; we think of the consequential flood sweeping away
everything in its part.
Nevertheless storms
like every force of nature are not entirely always destructive, many a time
they can be equally constructive. We forget that some of the most fertile soils
around today were brought about by the rich alluvial deposits of storms and
floods; we equally forget the rich deposits of precious metals and mineral
stones often buried in the alluvial deposits.
What this means
therefore is that storms and its accompanying floods and winds while sweeping
away everything along its path, can also at the same time mark a cleansing, a
cleansing of the Augean stables. So it is important to understand from the very
outset that the choice of the imagery of a gathering storm is very deliberate,
and that even though it envisages tension, it also connotes change, dramatic
change at that.
And the closer we get
to the 2015 general election, the better INEC gets at conducting elections, the
more intense the antagonistic machinations of rival politicians and rival
political parties will get. The more intense these rivalries get, the more
sense of foreboding among ordinary citizens will also increase.
Let us quickly take
critical looks at the Ekiti and Osun elections, the similarities and
differences, and how the experience from both will impact the upcoming Adamawa
elections, and shape the outcome of the 2015 general elections.
Let me however start
by very clearly declaring my political status; I am an activist for social
justice, a revolutionary fighting for the radical social and politico-economic
transformation of society in a manner that places political power in the hands
of ordinary people, as a means of ensuring a more equitable distribution of
wealth and access to opportunities among citizens.
I am a class
activist, one who while understanding the primacy of the class struggle,
nevertheless recognizes that this class struggle presents in a myriad of ways,
and unfolds simultaneously on multiple terrains of struggle. I am therefore not
a member or sympathizer of the PDP [Power Deceiving People], or the APC
[Association of Popular Conmen(and women)]; nor am I a member or sympathizer of
any of the elite political platforms masquerading as political parties,
including that quintessential stock market misnamed the Labour Party.
And although I am not
a member of any of the registered political parties, I am not an advocate of
political sidon-look, and I am not politically passive or neutral. I am convinced that the present crop of
Nigeria’s ruling political elite is incapable of being patriotic and
nationalistic; hence they are incapable of making a success of the nation
building project. They are neither patriotic nor nationalistic simply because
they do not believe in this nation; they still speak 54 years after
independence in the language of ethnicity, religion, and region or zone.
Even at the ongoing
National Conference, convened in 2014, in the 21st century, 100
years after the amalgamation, the political discourse of the representatives of
the political elites across the board has remained stuck in the ethno-religious
and regional quagmire. So they continue to speak for mythical geo-political
zones, and phantom regions; while in reality they are actually promoting their
rival individual interests, thus prioritizing their greed over our needs.
This situation is
made worse by their mental and psychological association of home, and thus
safety and security with Europe and the Americas, and not Nigeria. This is why
they aspire for dual citizenship, for residency status in Europe and North
America; it is why they marry their wives here, impregnate them here, but then
send them abroad to have their babies who then acquire the citizenship of those
countries as a result of the manipulation of the circumstance of their birth.
This psychosis is
rooted in and a carryover from the mentality of the African peasant in the
period before contact with Europe. The farm was always different from and
separated from the village. The farm was where we extracted surplus value; the
village was where we invested the proceeds of that extraction. The Nigerian
ruling class has retained this pre-historic mentality; Nigeria is their farm,
where they extract surplus value through treasury looting; whereas Europe and
North America is their longed for home and village where they invest the
proceeds of their loot. It is why even after looting our collective treasury
dry, they always prefer to invest or store the loot abroad.
Anyway, back to the
present, to the Osun and Ekiti elections. One of the clearest indication of the
fact that what we have are not political parties as vehicles for transforming
society, but political contraptions as vehicles for grabbing power in order to
have priority access to treasury looting, is manifested in the fact that there
are almost as many models of governance or the lack of it as there are
governors regardless of their political party affiliations.
So for instance
although Ekiti, Edo, Osun, Ogun, Lagos, Rivers, Adamawa, Nasarawa, Kano, or
Kwara are all for example APC governed states, nevertheless each is a different
model from the others. The Ekiti Model is quite distinct from the Osun model.
And whereas the incumbent in Ekiti against all sensible expectations lost the
elections, and lost for that matter to someone who had hitherto failed the test
of governance in that same office; the incumbent in Osun in Osun won
re-election. What was responsible for such parallel outcomes?
In Ekiti a lot has
been said about the role played by the deployment of the principle and practice
of stomach infrastructure on the one hand, and the massive deployment of
security forces on the other hand. Well Ekiti is one of the most literate
community in Nigeria, and one of the states with the highest number of highly
educated citizenry; so there is quite a lot of problem with the theory of
stomach infrastructure as the sole or main reason for the Ekiti outcome.
The Ekiti outcome
needs to be explained more deeply. It is true that the intimidating nature of
the unprecedented deployment of security forces played a significant role in
determining the turn out rate for the Ekiti election at just about 50%. It can
be argued that whereas the PDP candidate’s supporters came out to vote,
emboldened by their perception that the security deployment was in their
favour; a majority of the APC candidate’s supporters stayed at home, deterred
by the perception that the unprecedented scale of security deployment was against
them.
In the event, the
incumbent lost, and the challenger won by default. Dual invigorating [to the
PDP] and paralyzing [for the APC] role of this perception can even be gauged in
the attitudes of two candidates. The incumbent on election day appeared
subdued; the challenger appeared triumphant. Contrast this with the attitude
and dispositions of the incumbent and challenger in Osun, or in the Edo
election before the Ekiti election. In Osun the incumbent was manifestly
triumphant during all the stages of the electoral process.
Furthermore, in Osun
rather than being paralysed by the massive deployment of security forces
perceived to be hostile, the incumbent was galvanized by it, and directly and
practically led in organizing and mobilizing his support base, thus building
this base into a concrete mass movement. This was sorely absent in Ekiti. In
Osun therefore the turnout was far higher, and the incumbent’s support base
more cohesive and more galvanized and mobilized.
Before we turn to the
implications and inherent ironies of these two elections for the 2015 general
elections, let us quickly take a look at theory of stomach infrastructure with
respect to the Ekiti and Osun models. In both Ekiti and Osun, a lot of physical
and basic social infrastructure initiatives were undertaken, in Osun however
these directly materially also benefitted ordinary citizens, such as
technicians, tailors, small scale farmers, welders, etc who all played some
part in supplying materials, supplying goods and services, and in construction
exercises which were taking place.
Additionally, the incumbent directly related
with the citizens, spoke to them in their tongues even as he spoke fluent
English, so much so that if it was possible to raise the issue of aloofness and
distance from the people in Ekiti, it was near impossible to raise similar
issues in Osun.
So now what are the
implications and embedded ironies of the Ekiti and Osun Elections? Let us begin
with the massive deployment of security forces. Would the same level and scale
of deployment of security forces be possible or feasible in the 2015 general
elections across the entire country? If this would be possible, what would it
amount to?
More than 300,000 soldiers,
secret police, and mobile police [at the rate of between 10,000 and 20,000
deployed in Ekiti and Osun states respectively] deployed for electoral duty
across the country simultaneously? What would be the implication of this for
wider security? For instance while nearly 20,000 armed security personnel were deployed
for electoral duty in Osun, Gwoza in Borno State was left defenseless, bereft
of any security presence, and therefore became prey to Boko Haram’s destructive
siege over the weekend of the Osun elections.
Beyond security, the
wider implication is the role and place of popular mobilization into concrete
popular movements as demonstrated in Osun, in the 2015 general elections. What
manner will these take given the acrimonious and antagonistic jostling for
power by the major parties?
What is also becoming
increasingly obvious is that regardless of who emerges the victor, the outcome
of the 2015 general elections will lead to massive groundswell of a wave of
rising expectations, and that the victor in that election will sooner than
later be confronted by a major crisis of rising expectations. If the PDP wins
the general election, the APC may be poised to become the major beneficiary of
the eventual crisis of rising unfulfilled expectations; however, if the APC
emerges victorious in 2015, and is later confronted by a crisis of rising
unfulfilled and or unrealizable expectations; then a popular, mass political
movement, outside of the establishment set up could emerge as the vehicle for
articulating popular aspirations, and for realising popular power.
The historical task
confronting us, who are, or who desire to become very actively political, but
who are skeptical and reject organizing under any of the banners of the
existing party of looters, is to begin right now, immediately, the task of
creating and putting together the foundations and basic structures for such a
Popular Mass Political Movement of the ordinary citizens.
It is only if we
begin and undertake this arduous task now, and ceaselessly and relentlessly
pursue it, that we can be in a position to take the winds out of the sails of
the parties of the ruling elites when the gathering storm breaks out into a
deluge of crisis.
My experience in the
anti-military and pro-democracy struggles of the end of the last century; my
experience in organizing, mobilizing and being part of the leadership of the
January Uprising of 2012; as well as my experience in engaging with the 2014
National Conference; combine to convince me that the Nigerian elite is
incapable of transforming our nation; that we are the only forces who undertake
this historical task; and that only by building a Popular Mass Political
Movement for power can we successfully challenge the ruling class and be in
apposition to take popular power.
Follow
me on Twitter: @jayegaskia & @[DPSR]protesttopower; Interact with me on
FaceBook: Jaye Gaskia & Take Back Nigeria
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