By Chinweizu
It is self-defeating to go into a negotiation and
demand or expect things that are not possible.
That is a sure path to failure and frustration.
After all, as they say, politics is the art of the possible. So Ndi-Igbo need
to carefully asses the feasibility of whatever they set out to achieve at the
National Conference. And since it is going to be a multilateral negotiation,
they have to realize that they can only get what they desire if they can
persuade a majority of others to seek it in their own self-interest.
It would be foolish to expect others to abandon their
perceived self-interest and support the Ndi-Igbo self interest. Ndi-Igbo should
go only for options that are both desirable AND feasible.
That’s the sensible thing to do. What are the
alternative configurations of Nigeria that could emerge from the negotiations? And
what are the prospects for each configuration, in light of the interests of the
various groups/peoples that participate in the negotiations? And which
configuration should Ndi-Igbo work to realize?
The probable options are four:
A] Abuja, that is to say, the present fake
federalism.
B] Total Araba Now, the total and immediate breakup
of the present Nigeria, that is to say: to thy tents O Israel. Every people
goes its own way.
C] Partial Araba plus Aburi, that is to say the
Orkar solution plus Aburi, wherein Arewa leaves or is excised, and the rest of
Nigeria agree to stay together in Aburi-style Confederation/federation.
D] Aburi, that is to say, all the peoples in
Nigeria, including Arewa, remain together, but under an Aburi-style
Confederation/federation.
Assuming the negotiation is democratic and
decisions are either unanimous, by consensus, or by majority vote, let us
evaluate the support each option is likely to get.
A] Abuja, that is to say, the present fake
federalism.
This is the status quo. Only Arewa is likely to
want this. And I don’t see any other group going along. So this outcome is most
unlikely.
B] Total Araba Now, the total & immediate
breakup of Nigeria.
Total Araba Now is not in the self-interest of an
Arewa that has been committed to and enjoying hegemony under Caliphate
colonialism since 1960; nor is it in the self-interest of MB (Middle Belt), SW
or SS.
MB is at present very much fragmented, ethnically
and culturally, and needs time to build its organizational cohesion.
Furthermore, its economic base is weak, and total araba would at once leave it
economically impoverished. It is therefore unlikely to go for total araba at
this stage.
As for SW, their effort has been to coalesce the
Yoruba into a region, with their own government and the autonomy to organize
their industrialization, like in Awo’s Western Region. Leaving Nigeria entirely
is not likely to appeal strongly to them in light of their not having serious
oil and other mineral deposits.
As for SS, they have enough oil to go it alone, but
do they have the necessary organizational cohesion and cultural unity? I
suspect that once they obtain their main objective, resource control, they,
like MB, would prefer to stay in a larger entity while building their
organizational cohesion and cultural unity.
So, it is unlikely that any of these groups would
opt for Total Araba Now.
What of SE? Is it organizationally ready right now
for this option? Some SE persons and groups have emotionally welded themselves
to this option, but is it feasible? If SE goes for this option, it will find
itself isolated and defeated in the negotiations. What then would it do?
Try secession again? Does it have the capacity to fight another secession war?
I submit that it does not. It is now in an even
weaker economic and military position than Biafra was in 1967, when it
attempted secession and failed.
Furthermore, even in the most unlikely event that
Total Araba Now wins out, SE would need time to organize itself to receive back
and resettle the millions of its people who will be forcibly returned to their
enclave from all other parts of Nigeria.
These are therefore serious reasons why SE should
discard this option, even though it appeals strongly to some hearts: It will be
isolated in the negotiations and lose out and face the option of another futile
secession attempt; and it isn’t organizationally strong enough to handle the predictable
flood of millions of refugees if this option were to miraculously win out. So,
for Ndi-Igbo, I submit that the Total Araba Now option is not viable and is not
even a sensible one to propose.
C] Partial Araba plus Aburi, wherein Arewa
leaves or is excised.
All those who regard Arewa as the source of their
disadvantage or misfortune in the Abuja arrangement, are likely to support this
option. Nija would then continue as a true Federation/confederation of SW, SS,
MB and SE. Having removed Arewa, the root cause of the trouble with Lugard’s
Nigeria, the resulting Nigeria would be a bit smaller, but would have more
unity of outlook, and a viable economic basis for nation building and
development.
D] Aburi-style Confederation/federation.
If somehow option C fails, Arewa might reluctantly
accept this as its second best outcome. For while it would terminate its
domination of Nigeria, it would still give it a share in the riches of Nigeria
and leave it with access to the sea.
And once freed from Arewa domination by an
Aburi-type Federation/confederation, the other peoples might fall back on this
option as the minimum acceptable and available to all—i.e. the option that
guarantees the primary interest of every group. It still meets the interest of
SW for regional autonomy, the interest of SS for resource control, and the
interest of MB for separation from Arewa. This option would still meet SE’s
need for autonomy to ensure security and economic self-control.
For SE, getting control of its security and economy
would be a giant step out of the present hell of domination by Abuja. It is not
the most that we desire, but half a loaf is better than none.
Besides, struggles are wisely conducted stage by
stage: Aburi would give SE enough scope to prepare for greater autonomy or even
total independence whenever opportunity offers itself. It will be a holding
pattern for later development. It should, I think, be the fallback option
for SE, in case option C proves unobtainable.
Conclusion:
Ndi-Igbo would be well advised to mandate their
delegation to aim for option (C) i.e. Orkar + Aburi, with (D) i.e. Aburi, as their
minimum and fallback objective. Both (A) Abuja i.e. the status quo, and (B)
Total Araba Now should be rejected as not being in the Ndi- Igbo interest.
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For further information please contact Chinweizu:
sundoor999@gmail.com
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© Chinweizu 2013
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