The Hugo Chavez revolution (3)

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By Edwin Madunagu

Hugo Chavez

The 1989 massacre in Venezuela, as we saw in the closing paragraph of the last segment, greatly sharpened revolutionary and patriotic consciousness in Hugo Chavez group in the army. The aftermath of that mass slaughter – in which an estimated 5,000 people died – also included the rapid expansion of the group’s allies in the civil society and the group’s firm determination to strike the regime and the system at the earliest opportunity.

Nigerians older than, say 35, may remember the mass protests sparked in Nigeria in May 1989 by the hardships generated by General Ibrahim Babangida’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Like in Venezuela, there were massacres, there were arrests and there were detentions. And taking part in the protests were labour unions, popular-democratic organisations, human rights activists, students, professionals, academics, market women and men and de-classed individuals, the “wretched of the earth” and those Marx said were victims of  “no particular injustice, but injustice in general”. 

I cannot say if there were stirrings in the army on that occasion.  But many arrests took place on the Left: Tai Solarin (if I remember correctly), Gani Fawehinmi, Baba Omojola, Femi Falana, Beko Ransome-Kuti and several young activists produced by the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), etc, were detained. Some were later charged to court for treason.

Several political re-groupings were inspired on the Left: These included the Gani Fawehinmi Solidarity Organisation (GFSA) and the Popular Democratic Front (PDF). But unlike what happened in Venezuela three months earlier, the revolutionary momentum generated by the May 1989 events in Nigeria was lost. There were at least 10 other lost revolutionary moments during the long Babangida - Abacha military dictatorship  (1984 - 1998).

The period (1989-1992) was for Hugo Chavez’s military group the period of mobilisation and organisation and, I would add, waiting. But the waiting period ended when a serious national teachers strike erupted in January 1992.  On February 4, 1992, Lt. Col. Hugo Chavez initiated a country-wide “military uprising” in Venezuela. 

The rebels took a number of military barracks in Caracas, the capital, and some big cities, but could not take the presidential place.  This allowed President Carlos Andrez Perez to escape. The president then mobilized loyal troops and put down the rebellion. The rebels negotiated a surrender and Chavez was made to address “his companions in arms and the entire country on live TV from the Ministry of Defence.”  Marta Harnecker reported: “Hugo Chavez uttered the famous words ‘I take responsibility’ and ‘for now’ which catapulted him forward as a national leader. The MBR 200 was re-born nine years after its creation”.

The terms of surrender included the detention, and then discharge, of a number of rebels, including Chavez himself, from the army and the re-absorption of others. On November 27, 1992, just a couple of months after the February 4, 1992 defeat, and with Chavez and some of his colleagues in prison, another military coup d’etat was attempted. This one also failed. On this occasion senior officers, including generals, participated and more targets were seized.  

The same results followed.  On May 20, 1993, President Carlos Andres Perez was impeached by the Supreme Court for “misusing public funds”; on June 5, 1993, a transition government was installed to prepare for a presidential election; Hugo Chavez, from detention, called for “abstention” or, in his own words, “active abstention”, that is, “no to the parties, no to the elections, and yes to the proposal for a people’s constitutional assembly”.

Hugo Chavez’s revolutionary line greatly contributed to the achievement of 52 per cent abstention in the presidential election of November 4, 1993.  Dr. Rafael Caldera, however, won.  On March 26, 1994, the new president, who had included the pledge to release Hugo Chavez and his colleagues from prison in his manifesto, fulfilled this popular election promise. (That pledge had boosted his victory chances). 

The prisoners were released. The ex-military officers who now emerged from prison were mature revolutionaries in their own right, at comparable level of theoretical clarity and political experience with “established” civilian Leftist political leaders. They travelled round the country and, sometimes, outside. The group’s initial campaign was  “Constitutional Assembly Now!” Although it was a single-minded and consistent campaign, not distracted by enticing offers from the powers – that – were, it was soon to change strategically.

Shortly after his release from prison, Venezuelans, including activists and leftist leaders, started to agitate that MBR 200 should take part in the presidential elections scheduled for 1998 and that Hugo Chavez should contest.  Responding in 1996, the MBR 200 carried out a survey “to see how people felt about a electoral participation and whether Hugo Chavez should be a candidate”.  The result was an overwhelming “yes” for electoral participation and Hugo Chavez’s participation as presidential candidate.  

This was, by implication, a resolution of a debate that had been going on in the group for a long time, perhaps since Chavez and his comrades were in prison.  That debate was: What should now be the attitude of MBR 200 and its allies to the question of armed struggle and armed rebellion, given recent and current developments, including the failure of two successive military rebellions, one of them led by the group, and the increasing popularity of Hugo Chavez among the popular masses?

Hugo Chavez came out in support of participation and candidature and, by implication, the temporary or permanent suspension of armed struggle. Reinforcing the reasons already provided (failure of two military coups and his own increasing popularity), Hugo Chavez said categorically that the situation was “not ripe for another armed movement.” 

On April 19, 1997 MBR 200’s national congress decided to participate in the elections and to create a formal political party. That was how the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) was formed on October 21, 1997. In the December 6, 1998 presidential election Chavez won with 56 per cent of the votes in the first round. He was sworn in as president early in the year 1999.  Then began the revolutionary transformation, or the revolutionary process in Venezuela.

Having taken the strategic decision to seek power by electoral means, Hugo Chavez and his party, the MVR, now decided, after electoral victory, to pursue the revolutionary transformation by democratic and constitutional methods – whatever the provocations from the opposition and the permanent enemy, American imperialism. The first thing the new government did was to organize a referendum asking Venezuelans if a Constitutional Assembly should be convoked. 

That was in February 1999, a few weeks after inauguration. The people said, “yes”, that a Constitutional Assembly should be convoked to draft a new Constitution.  Five months later, in July 1999, a Constitutional Assembly election was held. The assembly was convoked immediately after, in August 1999. The assembly drafted its own laws to regulate its proceedings. It also set up a participation commission to mobilise, receive and collate public participation.

The need for a new constitution had been on the agenda of national discourse for quite a long time and every active political group had taken a position on the matter. So it took only four months to come out with a new draft constitution. In the national referendum on the draft, a “yes” vote of over 70 per cent was recorded.  President Hugo Chavez was now empowered to “move the country forward”, as Nigerian politicians would say – without, of course, meaning to move anything except themselves.

The critical point that should be noted here – a point that has already been made, but has to be made again and again – is that for the revolutionary forces, the decision to seek and exercise power and transform the country by constitutional, democratic and peaceful means was a strategic one deliberately taken after a study of the correlation of forces – national and international. 

It was not a tactical decision, which could be changed overnight, at the slightest difficulty or problem or provocation.  However, as I have also reported, the revolution, though peaceful, was not “disarmed”.  It was ready to defend itself – as it did in response to the April 11 – 13, 2002 abortive military coup (counter-revolution).

Right from inauguration, every action taken by President Chavez was backed by the Constitution. In particular, the president consulted the National Assembly on every major step his government intended to take even when the Constitution did not explicitly compel it. 

With the promulgation of the Constitution whose highlights included the responsibility of the government to articulate and pass empowerment, human rights, social equality, anti-poverty and anti-corruption laws, the Hugo Chavez government moved to strengthen the steps, which he had initiated under the provisions of the old basic law. 

The actions included the Plan Bolivar, which was a programme of revolutionary transformation, the opening up, of rural Venezuela – with oil money.  Yes, with Venezuela’s oil money.  The date of its commencement, February 27, 1999, was deliberately and symbolically chosen.

• To be continued.