The country ‘we wish to see’ (2)

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By Edwin Madunagu 

The first segment of this essay ended with a number of connected propositions, which can be re-presented as follows: That Nigeria is not the arithmetical sum of its ethnic or ethno-religious components, by which we mean that there are, in the composition of Nigeria today, entities that are simply Nigerian and that are, therefore - fortunately or unfortunately - inseparable into ethnic or ethno-religious components; and that the political history of Nigeria is not - or rather, is more than - a record of struggles between ethnic groups under the command of their respective leaders.

Furthermore, there does not exist a viable geopolitical restructuring of Nigeria in which there will not exist at least a component with significant minorities that will not fight for their  “national autonomy” or “national independence” if the country embarks on the “Yugoslav option” (1990-2000); and that although Nigeria is burdened by acute ethnic nationality question - arising, in part, from the manner the country was constituted between 1885 and 1914 and in part, by the way it has been governed from then to the present time - it can no longer be described - again, fortunately or unfortunately - as a mere “geographical expression”. What follows is an attempt to elaborate this multiple proposition, and then proceed from there.

In the opening paragraph of his book, The Fall of Nigeria, Obaro Ikime, a prominent Nigerian historian, says: “The bulk of what is now Nigeria became British territory in the period between 1885 and 1914. It is, therefore, usual when we speak of the British conquest of Nigeria to think in terms of the many military expeditions mounted against various Nigerian peoples during that period.  Yet, the events, which took place between 1885 and 1914, were but a culmination of a series of events, indeed a process, which began early in the nineteenth century”.

The earlier “events” referred to by Ikime include the suppression of slave trade, the promotion of so-called legitimate trade (including trade in palm oil) and the penetration and spread of Christianity. The “events” not only brought together Europeans and various peoples in the areas that later became Nigeria, they also further developed the diverse relationships, which had existed among the various peoples in these areas, “before the coming of the Bature”, if I may borrow from the title of one of Richard W. Hull’s books on this subject.

Long before the birth of Nigeria, there had been various forms of relationships (economic, social, cultural, etc) between the various peoples that lived in the areas that became Nigeria. Although we are right to speak of “forced union” when recounting the events of 1885 to 1914, we would be wrong to say that the peoples within this “forced union” were “strange bed-fellows”. This was one of the points the late Yusufu Bala Usman - together with the young intellectuals he inspired - vigorously made, elaborated and defended in his various combats on the interpretation of Nigerian history.

That I do not want to live with you does not mean we are strangers to one another; conversely certain factors (including persuasion, education or just your conduct) may make me want to live with you even if I have not known you for long. More directly, what you make of the fact of relations between our peoples “before the coming of the Bature”, and the political proposition you advance on that basis (and other bases) are entirely yours. But facts are facts; and they are different from opinions and choices. For instance, I did not, and still do not, agree with all of Bala’s opinions and political choices even though I accept most of his factual premises. (At a point, Bala sent me, through a very costly process and unsolicited, a big package containing many of his publications on the subject).

In the second part of his book earlier cited, Ikime tells specific stories of how the British conquered and occupied several Nigerian towns and peoples including Lagos, Calabar, Oyo, Ilorin, Brass, Benin, Aroland, Tivland, Borno, Zaria, Kano and Sokoto. These are stories of resistance and inevitable capitulation. But the next wave of anti-colonial struggle - after the fait accompli of conquest and occupation - was essentially within the context of Nigeria: to free Nigeria from foreign occupation, to gain self-government and independence for Nigeria and not for the entities Europeans had conquered and integrated. Later, still under colonialism, other struggles developed within this anti-colonial struggle.

The “struggles within struggle” included, in particular, ethnic minority, ethnic - hegemonic, constitutional, gender and ideological class struggles. But all the struggles - main struggle and the “struggles within struggle” - were waged within the context of “One Nigeria”. When independence was granted on October 1, 1960, it was not granted to autonomous territories that were individually conquered by the British prelude to unification, but to Nigeria as an entity. The ethnic minority “struggles within struggle” before and after independence, were for self-determination and autonomy within Nigeria. If they, at times, went outside this framework, it was out of frustration. The ethnic-hegemonic “struggles within struggle” have always carried implicit threats of separation. Between independence and January1970, the struggles led to mass murders, assassinations, secession and civil war.

The merger of the British Colony of Lagos and the British Protectorate of Southern Nigeria - with Lagos as the capital of the new entity (1906); the loss of status by Calabar and Lokoja and their replacement by Enugu and Kaduna and Ibadan; the creation and strengthening of the Northern, Eastern and Western Provinces (1936 and 1946); movement of the military headquarters of the territory that was to become Southern Protectorate from Asaba; and the confirmation of Nigeria as a federation of three regions - were all stages in the geopolitical structuring of the new British colony of Nigeria.

The colonial structuring was essentially for the convenience of the colonial administration. It is not that the British did not “consult” the “natives”. They “consulted” some traditional rulers (some of whom they created or upgraded) and some “natives” they regarded as having, by some criteria, attained the status of Europeans. But this “consultation” was merely cosmetic. The colonial regime knew what it wanted and knew what it was doing. For the people of the colony, the “natives”, however, the foundation was being laid for a twin-problem that was to remain and expand: the ethnic nationality question and the ethnic minority problem.

Between 1946 and 1954, the colonial power with minimal input from the nationalists who supported the federal idea or were indifferent towards it, but against opposition from some nationalists (especially militant nationalists), consolidated the federal structure and what I have called the tripod arrangement, that is, the construction of Western Region (around Yoruba core), Eastern Region (around Igbo core) and Northern Region (around Hausa-Fulani core).  The tripod was doubly unequal in the sense that the North occupied more than two-thirds of the total land area of Nigeria and accounted for about half the population, and the minority ethnic nationalities, which were estimated to be more than two hundred in number, together accounted for less than half of the total population of the colony.

It must, however, be stated that this “inequality” was not, and is still not, unique to Nigeria in the geopolitical history of the world. The issue was the relationships (of power) between the members of the tripod, the relationships between them on the hand, and the centre on the other, and the relationships between the regional centres and “their” minorities.

The attitudes of Nigeria’s political elite in this period - and even beyond, up to independence in October 1960 - can be sketched like this: Some of the “constitutional political leaderships” (that is, those that eventually succeeded the British) were unambiguously in support of federalism as a principle, and opposed to the tripod arrangement, preferring a simultaneous creation of several regions (or states) across the country.  Some others were ambivalent or inconsistent in their attitude to both federalism and the tripod arrangement - swinging from one extreme to the other. Some were firmly in support of federalism and the retention of the tripod arrangement. The ethnic minority constitutional leaderships were in support of federalism and the breakdown of the tripod arrangement.

However, the militant (“non-constitutional”) nationalists were opposed to the tripod arrangement - preferring the creation of several smaller regions or states preferably along non-ethnic or linguistic lines.  They would also want a federation of several states with a strong centre - but within the context or framework of socialist Nigeria. This arrangement has been called a unitary system - which is correct. Two factors are of critical importance here: First is that the position of militant nationalists was qualitatively different from all the other positions listed above; second is that the colonial rulers were irrevocably committed to handing over power to the leaderships of the tripod arrangement.

The continuation of this series will resume later in the year. In the meantime, another subject will occupy the attention of the column.